I ended the last post with a mention of Bob Lampman’s seminal chapter on Poverty in the annual economic report to the President (Kennedy). It cast doubt on the full efficacy of the ‘rising tide lifting all boats’ argument while suggesting that targeted public initiatives would be necessary.

Of course, Lampman’s arguments, while pursuasive, were not decisive to the story of how poverty once again became a ‘front-burner’ issue. That tale is more complicated than one chapter in an annual report. For example, some have pointed out that Kennedy had been quite moved by the abject poverty he witnessed while campaigning in West Virginia. Others noted the book by Michael Harrington titled The Other America which appears to have reminded the nation that an impoverished segment of the population still existed in an increasingly affluent America … a group that yet remained hidden from general view. And an Edward R. Murrow documentary, The Harvest of Shame, also had an outsized impact. While each of these  contributed something to the ‘rediscovery’ of poverty, I doubt any single one was seminal.

Rather, I believe the following happened. In the quarter-century following World War II, America experienced an extraordinary period of economic growth. In retrospect, this was not an unexpected or shocking development. We had about 6 percent of the word’s population but were generating about half of the globe’s total economic output. Our natural competitors were in ruins, bankrupt, in disarray, or all three. Moreover, the safety net enacted under FDR’S New Deal and related labor market protections (e.g., the Wagner Labor Relations Act) (surprisingly) were not dismantled when the Republicans took back power in the eatly 1950s. However, I yet wonder what might have happened if Robert Taft, not Eisenhower, had won the Republican nomination in 1952.

During these halcyon economic times, poverty was falling like a rock, from probably half the nation (or more) during the great depression to about 22 percent at the end of the 1950s. It continued to fall through the 60s, though at a reduced pace as the easy victories had already been secured. In addition, real income more than doubled during this period with every income quintile participating in this growth. That is, both income and wealth inequality were falling sharply in what later became known as the ‘great compression.’

We witnessed an economic environment conducive to the growth of an American middle class. This was an era of high taxes on the wealthy, of significant infrastructure investments (e.g. the interstate highway act), and strong unions … economic features that would soon come under virulent attack. It was an era where the public and private sectors worked for the benefit of all, perhaps reflecting a residue of collaboration remaining from the war effort (Note the highly effective G.I. Bill that enabled many to obtain a college education).

During this period, the critical point is that poverty was becoming a manageable issue, a social challenge that was feasible to attack with some prospect of success. Remember that Bob Lampman had argued that an expanding economy would continue to remove people from economic insecurity. But he had thrown in a critical caveat: the rising tide would leave some boats behind because of geography, race, or physical and cognitive limitations. These ‘structural’ pockets of poverty would demand special attention and targeted interventions by federal and state authorities.

In effect, poverty was seen as a war that could be won, something closer to a ‘mop-up’ action. Perhaps the poor will not always be with us, as the Bible suggests. In the 1960s, Nobel laureate James Tobin wrote that continued economic growth (supported by expansionary monetary and fiscal policies) when combined with targeted public interventions could yet eliminate poverty by 1976, the nation’s bicentennial celebration. Sensing such optimism and drawing upon his hardscrabble Texas roots as a teacher to poor Hispanic children as a young man, Lyndon Johnson declared a War On Poverty (WOP) in 1964. Picking up the themes that had been floating around the Kennedy administration, he created the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to coordinate this war.

To wage such a war, the generals needed two things: (1) a better understanding of the enemy, and (2) information, or intelligence, about that enemy. For the first task, Molly Orshansky, a mid-level bureaucrat in the Social Security Administration, was given the assignment to come up with a poverty measure. She did a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation. She took an older study that estimated that food absorbed about one-third of a low-income family’s budget. Then she took a more recent estimate of the lowest cost of a ‘basket’ of food items for such a family. Finally, she multiplied the cost of that ‘basket’ by three. Voila … a poverty standard.

That crude estimate became the ‘official’ poverty measure which, except for inflation updates and a few technical adjustments, remained the government sanctioned measure for decades even after it had come under widespread attack by scholars and serious policy wonks. [For example, food represented a smaller portion of total expenditures in more recent years which theoretically impacted the multiplier she used.] Years later, when she was long retired, I heard Molly express shock and dismay that no one followed up on her crude measure with a more sophisticated alternative. But, alas, politics often get in the way of reasonable decision-making.

For the second need, good intelligence, federal officials approached the University of Wisconsin for help, largely because of Bob Lampman’s connection to that campus. They wanted the school to create a kind of ‘think tank’ that would do thoughtful, independent research and analysis, the kind needed to successfully wage such a war. Though some at the University worried that getting overly involved in a controversial public policy issue would erode academic independence and expose the campus to political interference, the Institute for Research on Poverty was created in 1966 with Bob Lampman being appointed the first interim director.

In brief, the ‘war’ had two fronts. The first focused on rehabilitating people and communities, including strengthening local participation in the policy development process. These were purposes close to Johnson’s (and OEO’s) original vision. Initiatives such as Head Start, Upward Bound, Model Cities, Community Action Programs, and too many others to mention were developed under this banner.

The second front is best associated with what became known as the ‘Great Society.’ It involved either expanding or creating new benefits programs. We saw the creation of Medicaid, Medicare, a pilot Food Stamp initiative, along with new housing and education initiatives. Cash assistance for dependent children was made easier to access. No matter the tactic involved, this poverty ‘war’ remained front and center in most domestic policy debates. Bob Lampman himself noted that many policy makers applied a litmus test to new proposals … ‘what does it do for the poor?’

These two fronts reflected the interests and perspectives of the foot soldiers involved. In the beginning, social work and social workers were heavily committed, abetted by President Kennedy’s 1961 address to the nation which placed social work at the center of efforts to reduce welfare dependency by focusing on rehabilitative strategies. Soon, however, economists elbowed social workers aside, pushing cash and cash-like transfers as the primary strategy in the war. Social workers conceded their initial role without much protest.

Despite all the frantic effort and the jockying for control, there never was an underlying strategic consensus regarding this total ‘war’ on poverty. All the traditional tensions bubbled just under the surface:

What was the nature of the problem(s) being addressed … personal failings or institutional shortcomings?

What ends should be pursued … increased opportunities or guaranteed (income related) outcomes?

How should the disadvantaged be helped … human capital enhancements, increased job opportunities, community rehabilitation, the remediation of personal and family dysfunctions, or the direct transfer of cash and cash-like resources?

Who should be in charge … the federal government, the states, locals, nonprofits, or private markets.

And perhaps most importantly, did government action help or hurt?

As we will see, the so-called ‘war’ on poverty became a virulent political conflict centered about the very ‘war’ itself.