In the 1990s, even those of a more liberal persuasion saw a different role for government, one where programs ought to be designed in ways more consistent with prevailing norms which clearly were drifting in a more conservative direction. This normative drift was clear when I decided to spend a year in DC to work on President Clinton’s initiative to reform welfare. From June, 1993 to May, 1994, I was technically on leave from IRP and assigned as a senior policy consultant to the office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy and Evaluation (ASPE) at Health and Human Services (HHS). This was the nerve center for the administration’s welfare reform effort, a broad initiative involving several federal departments.
Not surprisingly, I found that the tensions across the partisan divide to be demanding, though not as daunting as they were to become in the post-Gingrich era. However, the normative tensions within the administration were equally as challenging. While some attention was directed toward income poverty, for example by liberalizing the Earned Income Tax Credit, the main focus was on mitigating welfare dependency. Whether an initiative would ‘end welfare as we knew it’ became the new litmus test for many in determining the worth of any new idea. At least, that was the message from the White House.
A debate raged within the Clinton administration: what did his oft repeated mantra of ‘ending welfare’ actually mean. One thing is certain. I seldom heard the old litmus test (what does it do for the poor) as reform ideas were being vetted. Ex UW Chancellor and current HHS Secretary Donna Shalala was an unabashed liberal. She focused her energies on health care reform, seemingly avoiding the conservative drift of the internal welfare debate. In any case, these internal debates delayed the anticipated completion of the welfare proposal long enough to forego serious Congressional consideration until after the midterm elections. By then, it was too late; the Republicans had taken control of the House.
That sad end was in the future. I recall rushing to DC as soon as my teaching obligations were finished for the Spring semester in 93. I worried that the reform package would be completed without my input. No worries. I knew the first morning that I had missed nothing. The internal policy struggles and philosophical disputes would go on for months. In January of 1994, word came down that welfare reform was being put on the back burner. Health care reform, an initiative headed by Hillary, was being prioritized.
That weekend, however, I watched Senator Patrick Moynihan on one of the Sunday AM talk shows. He blustered about there being no health care crisis. Rather, we had a welfare crisis. While I thought him dead wrong on his positive assessment of our health care system, I did appreciate the signal he was sending the administration. Welfare was back on the front burner when I arrived at the Humphrey Building (where HHS is located) the very next morning.
The old tensions remained, however. Essentially, the liberals scattered throughout the administration were desperately trying to preserve cash welfare as an entitlement in the face of changing normative opinions and political realities. In the end, that was a futile delaying tactic. At the 1994 State of the Union address, President Clinton announced he would have a welfare bill before Congress that Spring. I immediately pronounced to all who would listen that the date on the Bill would be June 21, 1994 (which I assumed was the final day of Spring). I proved prescient (that indeed was the date on the Act). I must admit, though, a good deal of my rhetoric survived in the final product. Nevertheless, it was DOA for reasons mentioned above. Byvsummer of 1994, all political attention was focused on the upcoming midterm Congressional elections (which brought Newt Gingrich and the Republicans to power).
The GOP had their own ideas, as you might imagine. After much back and forth, Clinton finally relented and signed a Republican-sponsored Bill in August of 1996. As the story goes, all of his advisors counseled him to veto the Republican Act except AL Gore, his Vice President. When he did sign it, several of his top advisors resigned, including Peter Edleman and Mary Jo Bane. The Act he signed created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. This law ended the existing entitlement to cash assistance, imposed time limits on the receipt of assistance, and strengthened work requirements. In a reasonably short order, the national cash welfare rolls fell from 14 million recipients to about 4 million.
That decline should not have shocked anyone. The W-2 reform in Wisconsin suggested what might happen if you transformed the very cultural foundations of a cash welfare program. An earlier conversation I had with a county welfare director in western Wisconsin gives you an idea of how profound the impacts were. Before W-2, she told me they had 1,400 AFDC cases. In the run-up to the reform (where the new expectations were made clear), the caseload fell to about 900 cases. When the county signed a contract with the state to run W-2 (as a block grant, not as a welfare entitlement), the state and county agreed that about 500 cases would be an excellent assumption for the post W-2 caseload. After the dust had settled, they found only 60 cases remaining. Alarmed, the director launched a study to find out what happened to the lost families. Most, she told me, had just disappeared.
The Welfare Peer Assistance Network (WELPAN) concept, which I put together just before the enactment of national reform in the mid-1990s, periodically brought together top state welfare officials for intense two or three day discussions on the future of reform. For me, it was another delightful counter in what I considered my professional candy store where I confronted captivating and confounding social issues.
The Midwest group (there were two others for a time) endured for well over a decade and, in my opinion, captured the best thinking of those who were making reform a reality on the ground. Given the new flexibility available to welfare administrators, and enjoying freed-up resources for a time, these officials yearned to go back to dealing with the root causes of poverty rather than merely slapping band aids on the symptoms. They discussed ways of once again joining human services with income support to heal whole families. And they played with ideas for integrating a broad array of human services into coherent packages to deal with the complex challenges many of these families faced. Finally, they sought ways to intervene early … before problems became entrenched and intractable. It was such an exciting and ambitious conversation, at least for a time.
Once the welfare debate ended on the national level, however, so did any substantive policy conversation regarding poverty and the poor, at least in Washington. For a while, there were great alarms raised among liberals about what would happen to poor mothers and children in the TANF era. Disaster was predicted while the federal government and Foundations poured millions into so-called ‘welfare leavers’ studies. But none of the worst predictions materialized. Most on the left failed to realize that cash welfare already had pretty much disappeared … typical benefit levels having eroded substantially over the previous two decades. When I arrived in DC, I kept saying we better reform AFDC soon, or there would be nothing left to worry about.
With national legislation a reality, and no catastrophic fall out, our political dialogue moved on. In contrast, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced a kind of British ‘war on poverty‘ in 1999. He pledged to eliminate child poverty in Great Britain over the next two decades. It is hard to imagine any U.S. politician, even President Obama, making a similar announcement during the post- reform period. The hard right campaign to reorient the acceptable political dialogue in America had succeeded beyond their wildest expectations. Everyone, it appeared, avoided discussing the poor. When they did, it was often in primitive, Dickensian terms.
The ferocious welfare debate was over. What did we achieve, if anything? Well, keep reading.



















