As homo sapiens, we are vulnerable to overstating our ability to comprehend the world about us. Some of that hubris stems from our past record of success in unraveling numerous opaque physical laws. I am yet astounded by scientific feats that permit us to send a spacecraft on a multi-year mission to hit a small sphere traveling through space at thousands of miles per hour. Such feats of technical accomplishment boggle my mind, which is not difficult to do given that I struggled mightily with high school algebra.
To my mind, there are two dimensions of reality where our understanding of how the world operates remains stubbornly illusory. One is the subatomic dimension where strange phenomenon and inexplicable happenings yet surprise, and occasionally confound, the best of physicists. The other is at the societal level where social scientists struggle to explain and predict behaviors (both macro and micro) with at best marginal success. There may be third dimension that lies beyond the scope of our known universe of some 93 billion light years across and which contains some 2 trillion galaxies, each comprising billions upon billions of stars. The very concept of such a vast world remains meta-physical in character … at least to me.
I’m familiar with some of the hard questions addressed by social sciencists, having banged my head against some of them during my career. So, I was taken by a book I recently read for one of my three book clubs (yes, I need to get a life). It is titled Fluke and was written by Brian Klaas. I found his work a compelling read for the best reason of all … his thesis conforms to my own priors.
Klaas argues that life at the macro or societal level, unlike complex technical questions, are much harder to understand. Why? Basically, outcomes are the result of a virtually infinite number of interacting events that cascade foward in complex ways because of human predilection and immeasurable uncertainties. Looking for easy causal chains in such a chaotic environment is a fools errand.
His first vignette is instructive. In 1945, Secretary of War Henry Stimson was involved in selecting the first Japanese target on which to drop an atomic bomb. At the top of the list given the committee was Kyoto, the former imperial Capital, now a major arms center for the Japanese military. Stimson refused to even consider this city. The other members of the committee were befuddled. It met ALL the selection criteria, the clear favorite. Why not Kyoto?
It turned out that Stimson and his then new bride had honeymooned in that very city some two decades earlier, when the cherry blossoms 🌸 were in bloom. He could not bear the thought of destroying a city toward which he felt such a sentimental attachment. Kyoto was thus spared, Hiroshima was not. On the second mission, the city of Nokura was the target. But when the bomber arrived over the site, an unexpected cloud cover was present. It appeared temporary, but the crew, fearing they were getting low on fuel, moved on to the back-up site of Nagasaki. On such idiosyncratic factors were the fates of thousands of lives determined. For many years, there was a common phrase in Japan … the luck of a Kokuran. This was the equivalent of the luck of the Irish.
We all have our favorite vignettes. Some 17 days before his first inauguration, a disgruntled immigrant, Giuseppe Zangara, attempted to assassinate FDR in Miami. Unfortunately for him, Anton Cermak, then mayor of Chicago, leaned into the open air car of the President elect at that moment, thus throwing Zangara’s aim off. Cermak died and five others wounded while Roosevelt lived to bring the country out of the depression, to successfully fight totalitarianism in Europe and the Far East, and to forge the U.S. into a global superpower. Had Roosevelt perished that evening, John Nance Garner would have held our highest office during this critical time. A staunch conservative and racist, this man was no FDR by a long shot. America (and the world) would not likely have fared so well (comparatively speaking). Perhaps we would all be speaking German now.
Then again, we have an incident during the height of the Cold War that could have altered history. It was 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The U.S. Navy had set up a quarantine line around the island to keep nuclear weapons from being operationalized some 90 miles from the American shoreline. A Russian sub had violated the quarantine line. Depth charges were dropped to get the sub to leave or to surface. Those on board this vessel were operating in 120-degree heat and had lost contact with the other Russian ships. They thought that, in all liklihood, World War III had started. The officers on board were poised to launch their on-board nuclear missiles in retaliation for what they thought was all our war.
In that moment, the world stood a breath away from nuclear disaster. Protocol demanded that 3 senior officers unanimously agree to launch their atomic weapons… the ship captain, the chief political officer on board, and the sub fleet commander (who by fate was on board this vessel). Two decided to launch. One held out. That single (and lonely) decision stood between the peaceful resolution that resulted and an unspeakable tragedy. On such thin threads is history held together.
Or take the time longer ago that the Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was on a state visit to Sarajevo in the summer or 1914. Bosnian independence fighters were out to assassinate the autocrat-in-waiting. As Ferdinand and his wife were driven through crowded streets, a bomb was thrown at his car. Several bystanders were wounded, but the principles escaped unharmed. Soon, the Archduke impulsively decided to visit the hospital where the wounded were being treated. At this point, another providential accident of history unfolded. The driver of the car took a wrong turn, then stalled as he attempted to redress his error. Another Bosnian terrorist (Gavrilo Princip) had been sitting glumly at an outdoor cafe, believing that he and his comrades had failed in their mission. Then he looked up and, to his utter astonishment, sat his target just a few feet away in a stalled automobile. He calmly stood and fired, killing both the Archduke and his wife.
On this act, World War I unfolded. For many, this War and the Second World War were considered part of a single cataclysmic event that transformed our world. Monarchical dynasties disappeared (or were diminished in stature) as the world evolved into a bipolar contest between two competing philosophies. The price for all this change was untold suffering and some 70 to 100 million deaths (depending on how you count things). Of course, all of this may have unfolded had the Archduke’s driver not made a wrong turn, but who knows. Perhaps what happens is inevitable or nothing is inevitable.
When I was doing policy, I watched my colleagues try to find certainty in a highly uncertain world. They did gold standard experiments (random assignment methods), did sophisticated observational studies on large data sets, and performed clever investigations where natural experiments were possible (careful to statistically account for confounding noise). All was done in the pursuit of causal relationships. Did A cause B and in what ways.
Yet, understanding collective human behavior remains elusive. Even interpreting the research results is subject to idiosyncratic values and differing normative values. Social science is much harder than the so-called ‘hard’ sciences. I recall one ‘brown bag’ (of the hundreds I attended). The presenter offered dozens of research results on the crowd-out effect of expanding government run and financed health care options. That is, how many families would abandon private insurance in the face of a public alternative. The estimates apparently ranged from a 0 substitution estimate to something on the order of 75 percent. I can just imagine the response of public officials to such uncertain and inconclusive results.
My good friends in the dismal science (economists) provided me with the best laughs of all. They created homo-economus as a way to understand how the world worked. Essentially, complex humans were stripped down to stick figures motivated almost entirely by utilitarian-maximizing motives. In their simple world, money made the world go round. On occasion, I would do some work to show that the real world, and actual human behavior, was far more complex than pavlovian responses to alternate marginal utility regimens. This is why even simple exercises such as projecting public costs and/or take-up rates are often hilariously wrong no matter the sophistication of the models employed. You can’t always anticipate the unanticipatable.
This probably is why I enjoyed my career. It was part science, part craft, and a lot of imaginative feel and analysis. In the end, you knew there would be no final and right answers. Perfect for someone like me. The chase was always preferable to catching the prize.













